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Abstract
Kim’s causal exclusion argument purports to demonstrate that the non-reductive physicalist
must treat mental properties (and macro-level properties in general) as causally inert. A number of
authors have attempted to resist Kim’s conclusion by utilizing the conceptual resources of Wood-
ward’s (2005) interventionist conception of causation. The viability of these responses has been
challenged by Gebharter (2017a), who argues that the causal exclusion argument is vindicated by
the theory of causal Bayesian networks (CBNs). Since the interventionist conception of causation
relies crucially on CBNs for its foundations, Gebharter’s argument appears to cast significant doubt
on interventionism’s antireductionist credentials. In the present article, we both (1) demonstrate
that Gebharter’s CBN-theoretic formulation of the exclusion argument relies on some unmotivated
and philosophically significant assumptions (especially regarding the relationship between CBNs and
the metaphysics of causal relevance), and (2) use Bayesian networks to develop a general theory
of causal inference for multi-level systems that can serve as the foundation for an antireductionist
interventionist account of causation.
1 Introduction
According to non-reductive physicalism, mental properties are not identical to physical properties,
but nevertheless supervene on physical properties. The rough idea is that mental and physical
properties are non-identical because the mental is multiply realized by the physical, but that every-
thing is nevertheless physical in the sense that fixing something’s physical properties fixes its mental
properties. Non-reductive physicalism has struck many philosophers as plausible, but Jaegwon Kim
(1989, 2000, 2003, 2005) has argued that it has an untoward consequence — namely, that mental
properties are causally inert.
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Figure 1: Informal Exclusion Argument
To illustrate Kim’s argument, consider the following toy example from Kim (2005). Let P1 and
P2 represent an agent’s physical states at times t1 and t2, respectively. Similarly, let M1 and M2
represent their mental states at those times. Now, let us follow the non-reductive physicalist in
assuming (i) that M1 and M2 supervene on P1 and P2 (respectively) and (ii) that P1 is a sufficient
cause of P2.
1 The question at issue is whether these assumptions are compatible with regarding
M1 as a cause of M2 or P2.
Suppose we know that P1, P2, M1 and M2 are instantiated and are curious about what causally
explains M2’s instantiation. Since the non-reductive physicalist contends that the occurrence of P1
is sufficient for the occurrence of P2, and that the occurrence of P2 is sufficient for the occurrence of
M2, there is no causal work for M1 to accomplish that goes over and above the causal contribution
of P1. Hence, were M1 to cause M2, then M1 and P1 would causally overdetermine M2.
2 But
according to Kim, this can’t be right because effects are not systematically overdetermined by their
causes, and we therefore must either reject non-reductive physicalism or accept that M1 is not
a cause of M2. Moreover, because the same argument applies when it comes to explaining the
occurence of P2 (since P1 is likewise a sufficient cause of P2), M1 cannot cause P2, and it thus
seems that we must either reject non-reductive physicalism or accept that mental properties are
causally inert, period. Crucially, it’s easy to see that the exclusion argument, as presented here,
can be straightforwardly applied to demonstrate the causal inefficacy of any macro-level properties
that are multiply realizable by micro-level counterparts.3
There is a vast literature analyzing the soundness of this informal version of the exclusion
1This assumption is often referred to as the “causal completeness of the physical” or the “causal closure of the physical.”
Interestingly, as we’ll see in Section 4, the causal completeness assumption is superfluous when Kim’s argument is viewed
through the lens of CBNs.
2The same goes for P2 since M1 and P1 threaten to causally overdetermine P2 in exactly the same way.
3This aspect of our informal reconstruction of Kim’s argument may lend some reason to doubt that it’s not faithful
to Kim’s original argument since (as an anonymous referee helpfully points out) Kim (2003, p. 167) maintains that his
argument does not imply the general thesis that a whole object cannot have causal powers over and above those had by its
parts. (This suggests that Kim would take issue with the claim that his argument applies to the general class of multiply
realizable macro-level properties.) If there is legitimate reason for this concern, this need not trouble the reader. For even
if our reconstruction is not faithful to Kim’s original argument, it is faithful to many descendants of Kim’s argument that
have occupied the literature — see, e.g., Baumgartner (2010), Gebharter (2017a), Polger et al. (2018), Sober and Shapiro
(2000), and Woodward (2008). Any reader who shares this concern is welcome to view our paper as a response to the
descendants of Kim’s argument that apply to the general class of multiply realizable macro-level properties, rather than
Kim’s argument itself.
2
argument. Of particular interest here is the recent strand of literature in which a number of
authors (e.g., Hitchcock (2012), List and Menzies (2009), Polger et al. (2018), Raatikainen (2010),
Shapiro and Sober (2007), Shapiro (2010), Weslake (2015), and Woodward (2008, 2014)) assess
Kim’s argument through the lens of Woodward’s (2005) interventionist account of causation. While
some authors (e.g., List and Menzies (2009), Polger et al. (2018), and Woodward (2014)) have
contended that an interventionist understanding of causation undermines some crucial premises
of the exclusion argument, others (e.g., Baumgartner (2010) and Gebharter (2017a)) have argued
that an interventionist conception of causation actually vindicates Kim’s argument. Our aim in
this article is to take the first steps towards developing a formally rigorous interventionist theory
of multi-level causation by providing its foundations in terms of causal Bayesian networks (CBNs).
The resulting framework not only reconciles the interventionist conception of causation with non-
reductive physicalism, but also fills some significant theoretical lacunae in extant interventionist
theories. More specifically, the plan is this.
We begin (§2) by providing a concise overview of the Spirtes et al. (2000) theory of CBNs and
describing its relation to Woodward’s (2005) interventionist account of causation. We then (§3)
generalize the theory of CBNs so that it allows for the consideration of variables that enter into
synchronic (non-causal) asymmetric supervenience relations. With this generalized framework in
place, we subsequently (§4) reconstruct and criticize Gebharter’s (2017a) vindication of the exclusion
argument in terms of CBNs (by arguing that it relies on some highly contentious hidden premises
concerning, first, what counts as an appropriate variable set in the context of multi-level causal
inference, and, second, the relationship between CBNs and the metaphysics of causal relevance).
We then (§5) develop a general approach to causal inference in multi-level settings that can be
used to ground a plausible and formally rigorous interventionist theory of multi-level causation,
and argue (§6) that the resulting theory can be used to make progress on some extant problems in
the causal inference literature. Finally, we conclude (§7) by considering our approach against the
backdrop of some examples from classical discussions of antireductionism.
2 Causal Bayesian Networks and Interventionism
The axiomatic theory of causal Bayesian networks (CBNs), as developed by e.g. Spirtes et al (2000)
and Pearl (1988, 2009), provides the formal foundations for Woodward’s (2005) interventionist the-
ory of causation. We begin by providing a brief overview of the CBN formalism and its relationship
to Woodwardian interventionism.
To start, suppose that there exists a set V of variables whose causal relationships we are in-
terested in studying. Each variable V ∈ V has some discrete set of mutually exclusive and jointly
exhaustive possible values.4 For example, we might consider the variable Mt whose possible values
represent the possible mental states mi of an agent at a fixed time t.
5 The causal structure over
V is the set of direct causal relationsips that obtain among the variables in V.6 This structure can
be depicted as a directed acyclic graph (DAG) in which the nodes represent the variables in V and
4The framework extends to continuous variables, but we limit our discussion to the discrete case for ease of exposition.
5Throughout the paper, italicized capital letters refer to variables, and italicized lowercase letters refer to their values.
6See Woodward (2005) for a philosophical analysis of what constitutes a ‘direct cause’ in this framework.
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Figure 2: Common Effect Structure
the edges represent the direct causal relationships that obtain between pairs of variables in V.7
For example, the DAG in Figure 2 represents a causal structure in which X and Y are both direct
causes of Z and in which neither X nor Y is a direct cause of the other.
If X is a direct cause of Y , we say that X is a parent of Y and that Y is a child of X. A directed
path between two variables X and Y is an ordered sequence of variables D = 〈X, ....., Y 〉 such that
each variable in the sequence is a child of the variable that comes before it. If there exists a directed
path from X to Y , we say that Y is a descendant of X and that X is an ancestor of Y .8 If there
does not exist a directed path from X to Y , we say that Y is a non-descendant of X.9
Among other things, the theory of CBNs provides the beginnings of a recipe for inferring causal
structure from observational data. Specifically, suppose that you are interested in describing the
causal structure over some variable set V. Suppose also that you have observational data regarding
the ways in which the values of the variables in V are correlated with one another. We can formalize
this supposition by assuming that you have access to some full probability distribution Pr over the
variables in V, where Pr is informed by the observational data about these variables. The CBN ax-
ioms provide rules for interpreting the implications of Pr for the causal structure of V. In particular,
the axioms rule out many possible causal structures as incompatible with the empirical evidence
encoded in Pr. The first and most fundamental axiom is the Causal Markov Condition (CMC),
which Hausman and Woodward (1999) argue is “implicit in the view that causes can be used to ma-
nipulate their effects,” and thus implicit in Woodward’s (2005) interventionist account of causation.
Causal Markov Condition (CMC): A graph G and a probability distribution Pr satisfy
the Causal Markov Condition if and only if every variable X in V is probabilistically independent
of its nondescendants conditional on its parents according to Pr.10
The CMC encodes the assumption that causes screen off their effects. It is a generalization
of Reichenbach’s (1956) Principle of the Common Cause, which says that if variables X and Y
are (unconditionally) correlated, then either X (directly or indirectly) causes Y , Y (directly or
indirectly) causes X, or X and Y are (direct or indirect) joint effects of a common cause. To
illustrate, suppose that V = {X,Y, Z} and that we know that X and Y are (unconditionally)
7A graph is acyclic if it does not contain any causal loops. The restriction to acyclic graphs encodes the idea that
causal relevance is asymmetric in the sense that X cannot be both a cause of Y and an effect of Y .
8For technical reasons that need not concern us here, X is also considered a descendant of itself.
9Again, the one exception is when X and Y denote the same variable. We neglect this case in the body for ease of
exposition.
10Where two variables X and Y are said to be probabilistically independent (or simply independent) when for any values
x, y of X and Y , P (y|x) = p(y).
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correlated. The CMC entails that the causal structure depicted in Figure 2 cannot be right, since it
posits neither any (direct or indirect) causal relationship between X and Y nor any common cause
of X and Y . Thus, the CMC by itself somewhat restricts the range of candidate causal structures
that are compatible with a given body of empirical evidence.
Still, the CMC does not narrow down the set of possible DAGs very much. For example, any
fully connected DAG (in which there exists a directed edge between every pair of variables) is always
consistent with the CMC. This underscores the fact that the CMC sticks its neck out with with
respect to which edges must be included given Pr, but does not stick its neck out with respect to
which edges should be absent given Pr. Contrapositively, the CMC dictates which probabilistic
independencies must obtain given the absence of edges, but does not say which dependencies must
obtain given the inclusion of edges. This means that the CMC must be supplemented with some
additional condition in order to render the inclusion of a directed edge informative.
The weakest (and therefore least controversial) axiom that is standardly assumed in addition
to the CMC is the Causal Minimality Condition (CMIN).11 In order to state the CMIN, we
need to introduce the notion of a proper subgraph. A DAG G′ is a proper subgraph of G if
and only if (i) G and G′ are defined over the same variable set, and (ii) the set of parent-child
relationships that obtain in G′ is a proper subset of the set of parent-child relations that obtain in G.
Causal Minimality Condition (CMIN): A graph G and a probability distribution Pr
satisfy the Causal Minimality Condition if and only if there exists no proper subgraph G′ of G
such that G′ and Pr jointly satisfy the CMC.
To illustrate the inferential power of the CMIN, suppose that X and Y are probabilistically
independent given any value of Z, but are unconditionally correlated. Then both of the DAGs in
Figure 3 satisfy the CMC. However, the DAG on the right is not minimal. By deleting the edge
from X to Y , we obtain the proper subgraph on the left, which still satisfies the CMC since X and
Y are by hypothesis probabilistically independent given any value of Z. Thus the CMIN provides
advice insofar as it tells us that we would be mistaken to treat X as a direct cause of Y in this
case since there is a more economical representation of the causal structure that is compatible with
what we know about the probabilistic relations between variables. Intuitively, the CMIN can be
interpreted as telling us to include only those causal relationships that are necessary to ensure that
the CMC is satisfied, or, alternatively, as requiring that each directed edge is encoding some actual
dependence. Moreover, like the CMC, the CMIN has been shown by Zhang and Spirtes (2011)
to be presupposed by interventionists in nearly every single case of causal inference that we ever
actually confront.12 How do these conditions underlie interventionism? Very roughly, the CMC is
what ensures that the intervention on X is correlated only with its effects, and the CMIN is what
11See Forster et al. (2018) for recent discussion of the CMIN and its stronger counterparts.
12Zhang and Spirtes’ (2011) point applies whenever the probability distribution over V is positive — i.e., when every
possible assignment of values over V is assigned positive probability. We will see that when we consider variables that
enter into non-causal dependence relations, the probability distribution over the variable set at hand is often not positive.
But when the variable set is restricted to variables that are distinct in the sense required to qualify as the relata of causal
relations, the distribution is very often (and perhaps always) positive. See Stern (forthcoming) for more discussion of this
issue.
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Figure 3: Minimal and Non-Minimal DAGs
ensures that the intervention on X is correlated with all of its effects.13 Thus the CMC and CMIN
jointly provide the axiomatic foundations for the theory of CBNs and the interventionist account
of causation.14
There is just one more assumption of the CBN framework that we must introduce here, largely
because it will play a crucial role in our analysis of Gebharter’s (2017) CBN-theoretic parsing of the
exclusion argument. The assumption concerns the kinds of variable sets to which the CBN axioms
can be legitimately applied. Consider the variable set V = {IC, SL}, where IC and SL represent
daily ice cream sales and suntan lotion sales. Plausibly, these two variables are highly correlated
(high suntan lotion sales are strongly indicative of high ice cream sales). Thus, when applied to V,
the CMC implies that there is some causal relationship between IC and SL. But this, of course,
is implausible. The problem is that we’ve neglected the fact that the correlation between IC and
SL is causally explained by some latent common cause — e.g., the weather (W ). Omitting this
common cause from the variable set V leads us to make a spurious causal inference, but when we
consider the extended variable set V+ = {IC, SL,W}, we see that the structure in which W is
represented as a common cause of SL and IC (and no other causal relationships obtain) satisfies
both of the axioms (provided that SL and IC are screened off by W ). Thus, the problem can be
remedied by stipulating that we can only legitimately apply the CBN axioms to variable sets which
are causally sufficient, where V is said to be causally sufficient if and only if for any X,Y ∈ V, if
Z is a common cause of X and Y , then Z ∈ V.15 The restriction to causally sufficient variable sets
is a common background assumption in the theory of CBNs.
13We will see later that there are cases where the intervention on X is not unconditionally correlated with some effect
of X (because of path cancellation), but even in these cases, the intervention on X is correlated with the relevant effect
when one of the canceling paths is blocked by conditioning on an intermediate variable. The CMIN is what entails this
conditional dependence.
14Strictly speaking, what Zhang and Spirtes (2011) show is that if the CMC is satisfied and one interprets direct
causation in an interventionist manner, then the CMIN holds. Thus this is the precise sense in which their result bears
on the foundations of interventionism. But there are other results in the offing. Gebharter and Schurz (2014) show how
that the CMC and CMIN can be used to derive the interventionist treatment of direct causation, and Gebharter (2017c)
and Stern (forthcoming) show that the CMC and the CMIN can be used to underwrite Woodward’s non-direct notions of
causal relevance in many contexts.
15There are numerous ways to narrow the set of common causes that must be included in a variable set. We opt for this
stronger constraint in order to simplify things.
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3 Generalizing Causal Graphs
Because the CMC is stated in terms of causal dependencies (insofar as parents and non-descendants
are defined in terms of direct and indirect causal relations), the CMC and the CMIN cannot
be justifiably assumed in multi-level settings — i.e., settings in which V is permitted to contain
variables X and Y such that Y (asymmetrically) supervenes on X. The basic problem is that
the CMC accounts for correlations by positing causal dependencies, but in multi-level settings,
these correlations can be due to non-causal asymmetric supervenience dependencies. For example,
if we assume the axioms over a variable set that includes one variable representing your current
psychology and another representing your current neurophysiology, then, because the state of your
psychology is evidentially relevant to the state of your brain, the axioms entail that either your
current brain state causes your current psychology, or that your current psychology causes your
current brain state. But this seems unreasonable since your current brain state and your current
psychology are neither spatiotemporally distinct nor individually manipulable, and the relata of
causal relations are spatiotemporally distinct and individually manipulable. So assuming the CBN
axioms in a multi-level setting typically leads to spurious causal inferences.
Might there be a way of revising the CMC and CMIN in order to incorporate non-causal asym-
metric supervenience dependencies? Perhaps it prima facie seems that we cannot because some
asymmetric supervenience relations are very clearly not causal relations. But as Schaffer (2015)
notes,16 there are many structural similarities between the two notions. First, just as causes ex-
plain their effects, but not vice versa, it seems that the subvenient explains the supervenient, but
not vice versa. To use Schaffer’s example — just as one can explain Koko the gorilla’s current
psychological state with a causal story about previous events in her life, but not vice versa, one
can explain Koko’s current psychological state in terms of her current neurophysiology, but not
her neurophysiology in terms of her psychological state. Second, and especially important here, it
seems that supervenience relations undergird probabilistic screening-off relations in much the same
way that causal relations do (see Schaffer (2015: 56-57)). If the well-being facts supervene on the
psychological facts and the psychological facts supervene on the physical facts, then the physical
facts are probabilistically independent of the well being facts conditional on the psychological facts.
Similarly, if two aspects of a system supervene on its more fundamental properties, then the su-
pervenience base screens off the two aspects. For example, if the color and electrical conductivity
of a surface both supervene on that surface’s subatomic structure, then color and conductivity
are clearly probabilistically independent when we specify the surface’s subatomic structure to a
sufficient degree of precision.17
This suggests that we may be able to generalize the CBN framework to allow for the consideration
of variable sets whose members supervene on one another. There is a sense in which Gebharter
(2017a) has already accomplished this feat (since he deploys the framework in the current setting),
but we prefer to reformulate the CBN axioms in our own way by introducing new terminology that
will earn its keep in subsequent applications. However, insofar as it relates to the analysis of the
exclusion argument, our generalization is materially equivalent to Gebharter’s.
16Schaffer is primarily interested in grounding rather than supervenience, but the structural analogies he observes all
carry over to the supervenience case.
17This follows from the fact that the subatomic structure fixes both.
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The easiest way to revise the CBN framework so that it accommodates asymmetric superve-
nience dependencies is to reinterpret the significance of a directed edge in a DAG disjunctively
— i.e., so that the presence of a directed edge from X to Y no longer signifies that X is a direct
cause of Y , but rather signifies that either X is a direct cause of Y , or Y directly (asymmetrically)
supervenes on X. Let us say that if either (i) X is a direct cause of Y , or (ii) the value of Y
directly (asymmetrically) supervenes on the value of X, then X is an e-parent of Y and that Y is
an e-child of X.18 An e-directed path between two variables X and Y is an ordered sequence of
variables D = 〈X, ....., Y 〉 such that each variable in the sequence is an e-child of the variable that
comes before it. If there exists an e-directed path from X to Y , we say that Y is an e-descendant
of X and that X is an e-ancestor of Y . If no e-directed path from X to Y exists, then we say that
Y is a non-e-descendant of X.19 With this terminology in hand, we can slightly modify the causal
modeling axioms in order to incorporate non-causal supervenience dependencies as follows.
Multi-Level Markov Condition (MMC): A graph G and a probability distribution Pr
satisfy the Multi-Level Markov Condition if and only if every variable X in V is probabilistically
independent of its non-e-descendants conditional on its parents according to Pr.
Multi-Level Minimality Condition (MMIN): A graph G and a probability distribution
Pr satisfy the Multi-Level Minimality Condition if and only if there exists no proper subgraph G′
of G such that G′ and Pr jointly satisfy the MMC.
The basic motivation behind the generalized axioms is simple. In the standard setting, the CBN
axioms can be interpreted as specifying which causal relations we need to posit in order to adequately
account for all the observed correlations. When we generalize the setting to allow for variables which
supervene on one another, we introduce the possibility that the observed correlations are indicative
of supervenience relations, rather than causal relations. The MMC takes this possibility into account
by generalizing the CMC condition in the obvious way—i.e., by accounting for observed correlations
via dependence relations which could be either causal relations or supervenience relations.
Gebharter (2017a) provides a list of three independent justifications for a multi-level generaliza-
tion of the CBN framework, but we think the most compelling motivations are (1) that causal and
supervenience relations seem to ground screening off relations in much the same way, (2) that there
are concrete realistic causal inference tasks in which it is intuitively desirable to consider multi-level
variable sets (and it is prima facie desirable that we be allowed to continue using the theory of CBNs
in these cases), and (3) that the MMC and MMIN axioms are intuitively plausible generalizations
of the CMC and CMIN that provide plausible solutions to difficult causal inference problems (as
we will see in §6). Furthermore, we should note that readers who remain unconvinced by these
considerations still have something to gain from the present analysis. Specifically, in section §4, we
show that even if one accepts Gebharter’s generalization of CBNs to the multi-level setting, it is
still possible to reject his purported vindication of the causal exclusion argument on his own terms
18We prefix these notions with ‘e-’ because both causal relationships and asymmetric supervenience relationships capably
support explanations.
19As before, the one exception is the case where X and Y denote the same variable. Just as we treated X as a descendant
of itself, we treat X as an e-descendant of itself.
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— i.e., within the generalized framework.
Now, one concern that one might have about the generalized axioms is that although they
may be useful for identifying when two variables are related by some dependence relation, they do
not specify the nature of the dependence. For example, imagine that the axioms identified some
DAG as compatible with Pr in which X is an e-parent of Y . The axioms don’t tell us anything
about whether we should regard X as a direct cause of Y or, alternatively, as a supervenience
base of Y . Clearly, if we want to get an accurate picture of the causal structure of V, we need a
way to distinguish between the edges that represent causal dependencies and those that represent
supervenience relations.
Towards this end, it is helpful to characterize exactly what it means for the value of one variable
to asymmetrically supervene on the value of another variable in a probabilistic setting.20 Since it
is often said that Y asymmetrically supervenes on X when (i) changes to Y necessitate changes
to X but not vice versa, and (ii) X determines Y , it is natural to say that Y supervenes on X
when (i) multiple values of X are compatible with some value of Y but not vice versa, and (ii) any
value of X fixes the value of Y. Here, a value x of X can be understood as “compatible” with a
value y of Y when Pr(x|y) > 0, and x can be said to “fix” the value of Y when Pr(y|x) = 1 for
all values of X and Y .21,22 For example, when we say that your psychological state asymmetrically
supervenes on your physical state, it is implied that there are multiple distinct physical realizations
compatible with your psychological state, but that there are not multiple distinct psychological
realizations compatible with your physical state (since your physical state fixes or determines your
psychological state).
With this rough characterization of asymmetric supervenience dependencies in place, we can
begin to investigate what distinguishes supervenience relations from causal relations in multi-level
settings in which MMC and MMIN are assumed. At first pass, it is attractive to claim that
Y supervenes on X exactly when (i) Y is an e-descendant of X, (ii) multiple values of X are
compatible with some value of Y but not vice versa, and (iii) any value of X fixes the value of Y. It
is clear, we think, that these three conditions are necessary for Y to asymmetrically supervene on
X, but it is less clear that they are jointly sufficient because this rules out the possibility of some
20As we emphasize below, there may be reason to think that metaphysical asymmetric supervenience relations cannot
be fully characterized in terms of probability theory. Still, it’s important to get the probabilistic signature right —
especially since this is where the action lies in the context of incorporating asymmetric supervenience relations into the
CBN framework.
21When supervenience is understood in this way, it is clear that the operative probability distributions will not generally
be positive in the sense that every assignment of values over V is assigned positive probability. This means that the
MMIN cannot be justified in multi-level contexts on the grounds that Zhang and Spirtes (2011) show that interventionist
treatments of causation presume the CMIN. But this shouldn’t surprise or worry us too much. First, we share this
assumption with Gebharter (2017a), so it is clearly appropriate to assume as we engage with his version of the exclusion
argument. Second, since interventionist treatments of causation traditionally say nothing about when supervenience
relations should be posited, it is obvious from the get-go that no such formal result or justification is in the offing. The
assumption of the MMIN thus rests simply on its plausibility as a generalization of the CMIN to multi-level contexts. If
the CMIN is plausible when no supervenience relations are present, then, by our lights, the MMIN is plausible when they
are.
22Because our probabilistic characterization of supervenience specifies nothing in addition to these determination rela-
tions, it is neutral between every theory of supervenience that says that when Y supervenes on X, there is no change in
Y without a change in X.
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kinds of deterministic causation (if no dependency can be both a supervenience dependency and a
causal dependency). Consider a system defined over a variable L that encodes whether a light is on
or off, and another variable S that encodes whether a switch is engaged in one of three positions:
off, dim, or bright. If putting the switch into any position other than ‘off’ is sufficient for the light’s
being on, then a directed edge from S to L meets the conditions for supervenience. So despite the
common intuition that the dependence between the S and L is causal, it appears to count as an
asymmetric supervenience relation, rather than a causal relation.
There are a several ways to respond to this. First, since supervenience dependencies are typically
regarded as synchronic, we can add a fourth condition to the analysis requiring that X and Y must
not be spatiotemporally distinct in order for Y to supervene on X. With this condition in place, all
four conditions can be treated as individually necessary and jointly sufficient without yielding the
verdict that L supervenes on S since L and S describe spatiotemporally distinct states of affairs.
Second, one might acknowledge that L supervenes on S, but contend that L can supervene on S
and be caused by S when L and S describe spatiotemporally distinct states of affairs. This response
has something going for it since the value of S determines the value of L in exactly the same way
that is characteristic of supervenience, but it requires a rather drastic revision to the philosophical
lexicon since we do not typically characterize one and the same dependency as both causal and
supervenient.23 Finally, one can respond that S does not cause L despite appearances because, for
one reason or another, the dependence between S and L does not meet the conditions required for
causation.
This last response may strike some as the least intuitive since philosophers sometimes write
as though deterministic causation is the norm. But as it turns out, through the lens of MMC
and MMIN, there is at least some reason to treat a dependency as non-causal when it meets the
first three conditions. Hausman (1998) convincingly argues that many plausible analyses of causal
relevance are committed to the claim that if X causes Y , then Y is also caused (causally influenced)
by some means that are independent from X.24 As things turn out, it is true (given MMIN and
MMC) that Y cannot be caused by means independent from X if X and Y jointly meet the first
three necessary conditions for supervenience provided above (because no minimal graph contains
an edge that can represent such a dependence). So there is at least some good reason to think of
these relations as non-causal.
At any rate, we assume in what follows that we have access to a principled method for distinguish-
ing edges that represent causal dependencies from edges that represent supervenience dependencies.
We don’t stick our necks out regarding which method is best, and the reader is welcome to fill in
the gaps however they see fit.
We now turn to our reconstruction of Gebharter’s (2017a) CBN-theoretic formulation of the
exclusion argument in our multi-level framework.
23For those who regard supervenience as a completely formal dependence, this may not require any revision to the
concept (since cases like the light switch still exemplify scenarios in which there is no change in one variable without
change in another). We take no stand on whether a purely formal characterization of supervenience is more useful for
philosophical purposes than others that are additionally intended to capture some metaphysical dependence between higher
and lower level properties.
24A cause of Y qualifies as independent from X if and only if it is neither causally downstream nor upstream from X
and X and Y are not (indirect or direct) effects of some common cause.
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Figure 4: Assumed Dependencies in Exclusion Argument
4 CBNs and Causal Exclusion
The table is now set to consider the exclusion argument against the backdrop of our generalized
axiomatic framework.25 Recall the simple example where P1 and P2 are variables whose values are
given by the possible physical states of an agent at times t1 and t2, respectively. Similarly, let M1
and M2 be variables whose values are given by the agent’s possible mental states at those times.
Suppose that the agent’s mental state at a time supervenes on their physical state at that time, i.e.,
the value of P1/P2 fixes the value of M1/M2. Suppose further that the agent’s physical state at time
t1 causally influences (and is correlated with) their physical state at time t2. These assumptions
straightforwardly require that we posit each of the directed edges that are depicted in Figure 4.
This is in line with the usual formulation of the exclusion argument, where it is assumed that
M1 and M2 supervene on P1 and P2, and that P1 directly causally influences P2. The question
now is whether the generalized CBN axioms require/allow us to add additional edges from M1 to
P2 and/or M2. First, we need to check whether the DAG in Figure 4 (call it ‘G’) satisfies the
MMC. According to the MMC, G requires only that M1 and M2 are independent conditional on
any value of P1 or P2. And indeed, it is easy to see that both of these conditional independencies
are guaranteed to hold by the supervenience assumptions outlined above. Specifically, since M1 is
assumed to supervene on P1, conditioning on any value of P1 will uniquely fix the value of M1.
And once the value of M1 is fixed with probability 1, it can no longer be correlated with M2 (or
with any variable whatsoever). Symmetric reasoning shows that the independence of M1 and M2
given P2 is guaranteed by the assumption that M2 supervenes on P2. Thus, the two conditional
independencies which are required for G to satisfy the MMC are indeed guaranteed to hold by the
assumptions of the exclusion argument. This immediately entails that any DAG G∗ which — (i)
respects the assumptions of the exclusion argument, and (ii) includes an edge from M1 to either
P2 or M2 — is bound to violate the generalized minimality condition MMIN. Why? Since G itself
satisfies MMC, any supergraph of G will not qualify as minimal (including those in which there are
edges protruding from M1).
At first blush, this looks like an elegant formal vindication of the causal exclusion argument.
Assuming only the multi-level generalizations of the basic axioms of the theory of CBNs (and the
supervenience of the mental on the physical), we seem to have demonstrated the causal inefficacy of
mental phenomena. Furthermore, there is a clear sense in which the argument given here justifies
25The formalization of the argument given here is somewhat different from Gebharter’s formalization, but not in any
way that affects the philosophical analysis that follows.
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the intuition behind Kim’s original exclusion argument. The standard informal version of the
exclusion argument is based on the idea that mental causation is in some sense redundant (since all
the real causal work is being done at the physical level), and that positing mental causation leads
to overdetermination. Similarly, the argument from MMIN shows that it is possible to have an
adequate representation of causal structure (in the sense of satisfying the MMC) without including
any mental causation. So mental causation is theoretically superfluous, and positing it means
positing redundant causal relations. As Gebharter puts it,
Our result may be interpreted as empirically informed support for epiphenomenalism or
as evidence against non-reductive physicalism: If causation is characterized by means
of the causal Markov condition and the causal minimality condition, we assume that
mental properties are non-identical to their physical supervenience bases, and that every
physical property has sufficient physical cause, then mental properties cannot act as
causes for physical properties or as causes for other mental properties – they possess no
causal power. (Gebharter 2017a: 364)
At this stage, it’s worth pausing to note that in our reconstruction of the exclusion argument, the
‘causal closure of the physical’ assumption plays no role. In particular, unlike Gebharter (2017a),
we do not assume that every physical property has sufficient physical cause.26 Indeed, we don’t
assume that the relationship between P1 and P2 is deterministic in any way. We assume only that
P1 has some causal influence on P2, and leave the nature of that causal relationship completely
unspecified. This is significant, since the causal closure assumption has been the source of much
controversy (regarding both its plausibility and its proper formulation) in the literature (see e.g.
Baker (1993), Hendry (2006) and Stapp (2005)), and dispensing with the assumption seems to
significantly strengthen Kim’s argument.27
Overall, then, the generalized CBN axioms ground a formally rigorous statement of the causal
exclusion argument that seems to entail, in full generality, the causal inefficacy of mental phenomena
(given nonreductive physicalism).28 Moreover, the resulting formulation of the argument dispenses
with one of the strongest and most controversial premises of the standard formulation of the exclu-
sion argument (the causal closure of the physical). So as far as CBNs are concerned, things may
seem to look good for the exclusion argument. But not so fast. It’s time to put the champagne
back on ice.
26In later work, Gebharter (2017b) himself acknowledges that this assumption need not play any role and produces his
own alternative formalization of the argument that dispenses with the causal closure condition.
27It is worth noting that Kim provided an alternative version of his own argument that relied on the causal closure
assumption rather than any claim about supervenience. This version is neither strictly stronger nor strictly weaker than
our own.
28It is worth noting that, unlike previous interventionist discussions of the exclusion argument, this reconstruction focuses
primarily on the implications of the multi-level CBN axioms, rather than on the formally related problem of representing
macro-level interventions in multi-level settings. We intend to return to this latter issue in future work that generalizes
Eva and Stern’s (2019) interventionist treatment of causal explanatory power to multi-level settings.
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Figure 5: Birth Control, Pregnancy, Thrombosis
5 Antireductionist CBNs
In the previous section, we showed that any DAG which represents the causal structure of the
variable set V = {P1, P2,M1,M2} in a way that satisfies some antireductionist commitments and
MMC and MMIN will depict M1 as causally inert. But this observation alone is not sufficient to
warrant the conclusion that M1 is causally inert.
To illustrate, consider Hesslow’s (1976) example (depicted in Figure 5), according to which
taking birth control (BC) probabilistically promotes thrombosis (TH) if you are pregnant (or if
you aren’t), but also reduces the risk of thrombosis by reducing the risk of pregnancy (P ). Now,
further suppose that the probabilistic effect of BC that is mediated by P cancels out the probabilistic
effect that is due to BC’s direct effect on TH.
The graph in Figure 5 accurately captures the true causal structure over the variable set V =
{TH,BC,P}. But this is not the only variable set that is deemed appropriate for consideration in
this context. Since the variable P is not a common cause of BC and TH, there is nothing wrong
with omitting it from the variable set under consideration (at least according to standard practice).
Thus the variable set consisting only of BC and TH is considered fair game for causal inference.
But when we apply the CMC and the CMIN to the reduced variable set V− = {BC, TH}, we
obtain a DAG that does not include any causal arrows despite our background knowledge that BC
is causally relevant to TH. For, by stipulation, BC and TH are probabilistically independent,
which means that no directed edges are required in order to satisfy the CMC, and hence that the
completely unconnected graph is minimal.
The lesson of this is of course not that BC is causally irrelevant to TH. Rather, it’s that we
cannot conclude that there is no causal relationship between two variables when we find that those
variables are not linked by a directed edge in some admissible DAG over some causally sufficient
variable set. That’s just not the way that the epistemology of causation is related to its metaphysics
— i.e., the absence of an arrow in a DAG does not always mean the absence of a causal relationship
in the world. For, it could be that there exists another causally sufficient variable set relative to
which there does exist an admissible DAG in which X is depicted as a cause of Y . And in some
cases, this is enough to indicate that X really is a cause of Y (e.g., when X and Y are BC and
TH).
To make things a bit more precise, consider the following two principles concerning the
relationship between the existence of admissible DAGs over causally sufficient variable sets and the
causal structure of the world.
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Strict Causation Principle (SCP): In order for a variable X to count as causally relevant
to a variable Y , it must be the case that for every causally sufficient variable set V containing X
and Y , there exists a directed path from X to Y in some admissible graph over V.
Weak Causation Principle (WCP): In order for a variable X to count as causally relevant
to a variable Y , there must be some causally sufficient variable set V containing X and Y such
that there exists a directed path from X to Y in some admissible graph over V.
If we employ the SCP, then we are forced to conclude that in cases like the one describe above,
BC is not a cause of TH, which looks like the wrong verdict. More generally, it seems that the
SCP sets the bar too high for identifying the presence of causal relations in the world. In contrast,
the WCP gets the case just right. Since BC is depicted as a cause of TH in an admissible DAG
over some causally sufficient variable set, it’s consistent with the WCP that BC really is a cause of
TH. Of course, since the WCP and the SCP only specify candidate necessary conditions for causal
relevance, one must identify some other truths about causal relevance in order to identify conditions
that are jointly sufficient. But if, for example, causes temporally precede their effects, then as Stern
(forthcoming) argues, we can justifiably infer that X is causally relevant to Y whenever X is a
direct cause of Y relative to some causally sufficient variable set, where the operative notion of
‘direct cause’ takes stock of the fact that causes must temporally precede their effects.29 Similarly,
according to Woodward (2008b), if we use his (2003) interventionist treatment of causation to find
that X is a “contributing cause” of Y relative to some variable set, then we can safely infer that
X is causally relevant to Y , simpliciter.
We return now to the CBN-theoretic reformulation of the exclusion argument. In this context,
in order to infer a DAG from a probability distribution, we must assume more than just that
causes temporally precede their effects since there are now non-causal relations at play. But if
we additionally assume that non-causal supervenience edges must go from the more fundamental
(micro-level) to the less fundamental (macro-level),30 then, as we’ve implicitly shown above, any
DAG over the variable set V = {P1, P2,M1,M2} that satisfies MMC and MMIN will depict M1 as
causally inert. Since there’s no reason to think that V omits any common causes, we know that
there is an admissible DAG containing M1 and M2 relative to which M1 is not depicted as a cause
M2. And the same goes for M1 and P2. Thus if we assume the SCP, then M1 turns out to be
causally inert. But as we’ve just argued, we don’t even need to consider the multi-level setting
in order to see that the SCP condition is too strong — i.e., even in the single-level setting, there
are cases where two variables are causally related despite the fact that the relation is not apparent
relative to some appropriate variable set. Hence our advocacy of the WCP over the SCP. And once
we replace the SCP with the WCP, the observation that M1 is depicted as causally inert relative
to some causally sufficient variable set is not enough to warrant the conclusion that M1 is causally
inert in the world. It could be that, like BC, the causal efficacy of M1 is revealed in some variable
29To be clear, Stern’s treatment of causal relevance is in keeping with the WCP insofar as he argues that X is a cause of
Y exactly when X is a direct cause of Y relative to some causally sufficient variable set. The temporal aspect of Stern’s
treatment of causal relevance comes in at the level of his understanding of direct causal relevance, and thereby provides a
necessary condition for causal relevance that works in tandem with the WCP and the axioms of the CBN framework.
30In this paper, we always make this assumption in multi-level contexts.
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Figure 6: Minimal DAG’s over V1 and V2
sets, and masked in others.
So the antireductionist has an escape route. They can adopt the WCP and attempt to identify
some other causally sufficient variable set relative to which there exists some admissible DAG that
depicts M1 as causally efficacious, thereby vindicating the antireductionist’s conviction that mental
events need not be causally inert. Two natural variable sets to consider here are V1 = {P2,M1,M2}
and V2 = {M1,M2}. The DAGs in Figure 6 satisfy both MMC and MMIN for these variable sets.31
The set V1 is obtained by omitting M1’s supervenience base P1, and relative to the minimal DAG
over V1 depicted in Figure 6, M1 is represented as a direct cause of P2. The set V2 is obtained
by omitting both of the physical variables, P1 and P2, and relative to the minimal DAG over V2
depicted in Figure 6, M1 is represented as a cause of M2. Thus, if we are happy to accept the
variable sets V1 and V2 as causally sufficient, then the WCP allows M1 to qualify as a cause of
both P2 and M2.
The antireductionist can make a simple argument to get across the finishing line here. Neither
P1 nor P2 are common causes of any pairs of variables under consideration. The only causal relation
that either P1 or P2 stand in with respect to these variables is that P1 causally influences P2. By
stipulation, the dependence of M1/M2 on P1/P2 is a supervenience relation, not a causal relation.
So neither V1 nor V2 omit any common causes. Ergo, they are both causally sufficient variable
sets. So the antireductionist can conclude that regarding M1 as a cause of both P2 and M2 is
perfectly consistent with the WCP.
Fans of Kim’s exclusion argument may be unimpressed by this response. They can counter that
like the CMC and the CMIN, the definition of what counts as an appropriate variable set needs to
be generalized upon moving to the multi-level setting. In particular, they can propose that we re-
place the normal definition of causal sufficiency with the following natural multi-level generalization.
E-Parent Sufficiency: A variable set V is e-parent sufficient if and only there do not exist
any variables L,X, Y such that (i) L /∈ V, (ii) X,Y ∈ V, and (iii) L is a common e-parent of X
and Y in an admissible graph over the extended variable set V ∪ {L}.
This is just the obvious generalization of the causal sufficiency condition to the multi-level
setting. To get a feeling for how it works, recall the variable sets V1 = {P2,M1,M2} and V2 =
31Here, we assume only that M1 is correlated with P2 and M2. This is a very weak and compelling assumption, given
the premises of the exclusion argument (that M1 and M2 supervene on P1 and P2 and that P2 is causally influenced by and
correlated with P1). In fact, if we suppose that all values of P1 and P2 have positive prior probability, then the assumption
follows from the premises. It is also assumed by Gebharter (2017a) in his formulation of the exclusion argument.
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{M1,M2}. Neither set is e-parent sufficient since they both omit the variable P1, which is an e-
parent of M1 and P2 when added to V1, and an e-parent of M1 and M2 when added to V2. So
neither of the variable sets that the antireductionist uses to resist the exclusion argument satisfies
the natural multi-level generalization of causal sufficiency. This means that fans of Kim’s argument
can resist the antireductionist’s rebuttal by arguing that we should adopt a version of the WCP
that is articulated in terms of e-parent sufficiency rather than causal sufficiency, and, in the process,
block the conclusions that the antireductionist draws from V1 and V2.
According to this line of thought, the dispute between antireductionists and their opposition rests
on a disagreement about what variable sets can be legitimately considered when investigating the
causal structure of multi-level systems.32 If, on the one hand, we require only that variable sets be
causally sufficient, then the antireductionist is apparently able to demonstrate the causal efficacy of
mental properties. However, if, on the other hand, we require satisfaction of the generalized e-parent
sufficiency condition, then the CBN-theoretic vindication of the exclusion argument appears to go
through successfully. Thus the crucial question is whether there is any principled reason to replace
the standard causal sufficiency condition with the much stricter e-parent sufficiency condition.
To the extent that there is independent reason for non-reductive physicalists to countenance the
existence of macro-level causal relations, there appears to be reason to side with causal sufficiency.
Remember that Kim’s argument is supposed to show that non-reductive physicalism has the un-
toward consequence of implying that macro-level properties are causally inert. If antireductionists
can consistently avoid this untoward consequence by siding with causal sufficiency over e-parent
sufficiency, then even Kim should agree that there is reason to side with causal sufficiency.
But the issue is complicated by the fact that not every non-reductive physicalist regards the
consequence of macro-level epiphenomenalism as untoward. These philosophers’ motivations differ
from one to the next,33 but they are typically in agreement that scientific practice should be revised
so that higher-level causes are not countenanced. This dispute between the epiphenomenalist and
the antireductionist is unfortunately not one that we can settle here. In order to do so, we would
have to take stock of the many arguments offered on both sides, and there simply isn’t enough space
in this paper to do so effectively. What we can show, however, is that Kim’s conditional conclusion
— i.e., that if non-reductive physicalism is true, then macro-level properties are causally inert — is
false when viewed through the lens of CBNs. This follows from what we’ve already demonstrated —
i.e., that CBNs can be used to develop an account of multi-level causal inference that is consistent
with both non-reductive physicalism and the causal efficacy of macro-level properties simply by
siding with causal sufficiency over e-parent sufficiency. Thus by demonstrating the existence of
32Polger et al. (2018) make a similar point. Their response to Kim’s argument is that mental variables and physical
variables should not be in competition, and their argument turns on their observation that it’s inappropriate for inter-
ventionists to consider variable sets that include P1 and M1 (or P2 and M2) under the assumption of the CMC. Here, we
are more ecumenical about what variables can be considered alongside each other — indeed, we generalize the usual CBN
framework partially to allow for consideration of variable sets that Polger et al. rightly deem problematic in the standard
CBN setting — but we agree with Polger et al. that at least as far as CBNs are concerned, the debate turns on what
variable sets should be considered appropriate for causal inference.
33For example, Gebharter (2017a) can be interpreted as championing epiphenomenalism on the grounds that it follows
from his preferred view of causation in conjunction with the the thesis that mental properties supervene on micro-level
physical properties, while Segal (2009) champions epiphenomenalism on the grounds that mental properties are disposi-
tional, and dispositions are not causally efficacious.
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this choice point in the development of interventionism, we’ve shown that not all non-reductive
physicalist interventionist roads lead to epiphenomenalism, and have thereby revealed new paths
to antireductionist interventionism.
Still, there are some extant arguments in the literature that prima facie seem to provide positive
reason to side with e-parent sufficiency over causal sufficiency on the grounds that e-parent suffi-
ciency correctly falsifies some causal generalizations that are in terms of non-projectible predicates
(e.g., ‘jade’ in Kim’s famous (1992) example),34 while causal sufficiency problematically counte-
nances these causal generalizations as true. In the next section, we show that there is yet another
constraint on variable sets that shares e-parent sufficiency’s ability to rule out these problematic
causal generalizations without sharing e-parent sufficiency’s vindication of full-blown macro-level
epiphenomenalism.
6 Difference Maker Sufficiency
We expect that some philosophers will contend that there are real scientific contexts where it is of
utmost importance that we attend to the way in which some macro-level property is realized, and
that in these contexts, it is e-parent sufficiency that gets things right. For example, in Kim’s (1992)
example, chemists err if they study minerals in terms of what we once called ‘jade’ rather than in
the more fine-grained terms of ‘jadeite’ and ‘nephrite’ (where ‘jade’ designates the disjunction of
‘jadeite’ and ‘nephrite’) because it matters whether a given instance of jade is actually jadeite or
nephrite when it comes to predicting its chemical behavior.
In the causal inference literature, this same problem has reared its head in the so-called “choles-
terol problem.” Following Spirtes and Scheines (2004), suppose that high density cholesterol (HDC)
causally inhibits (and is negatively correlated with) heart disease (D) and that low density choles-
terol (LDC) causally promotes (and is positively correlated with) heart disease. Furthermore,
let the variable TC (‘total cholesterol’) denote the sum of high and low density cholesterol, i.e.
TC = HDC + LDC. Suppose also that in actual fact, TC is positively correlated with D. People
with high total cholesterol have, on average, a significantly higher risk of heart disease. However,
the specific make up of an individual’s total cholesterol has a major impact on their risk of heart
disease. Two individuals with the same total cholesterol can have very different risks of heart dis-
ease. For example, an individual with HDC = 80 and LDC = 120 will have a much higher risk
than an individual with HDC = 120 and LDC = 80, even though they both have TC = 200.
In this context, the question of what happens when we intervene to set the value of total choles-
terol to some particular value seems to have no determinate answer. If we increase an individual’s
total cholesterol by feeding them something that increases their high density cholesterol, then the
intervention may reduce the risk of heart disease. But if we increase total cholesterol the same
amount by feeding them something that increases their low density cholesterol, then their risk of
heart disease will be significantly increased. The problem is that interventions on TC are too
“fat-handed” for determinate inference. In this case, the realizers make a difference. And e-parent
34Kim (1992) famously argues that special science kinds are not autonomous from lower-level kinds on the grounds that
generalizations about jade cannot be included in good science, and must instead be replaced with generalizations about
jadeite and nephrite.
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sufficiency redirects our attention towards these realizers. To see this, note that V = {TC,D} is not
e-parent sufficient because its omits the common e-parent, LDC ×HDC.35 So e-parent sufficiency
forces us to consider the variable whose values are realize the values of TC. In contrast, causal
sufficiency permits us to neglect TC’s realizers (since V = {TC,D} is causally sufficient).36 By
the same token, e-parent sufficiency also forces us to consider whether a given instance of jade is
jadeite or nephrite when considering its bearing, e.g., on whether it scratches a steel nail (because
the variable that denotes whether something is jadeite, nephrite, or neither is a common e-parent of
the variable that expresses whether something is jade and the variable that expresses whether some-
thing scratches a steel nail), while causal sufficiency allows one to ignore whether a given instance
of jade is jadeite or nephrite when considering the same query (because the variable that denotes
whether something is jadeite, nephrite, or neither is not a common cause of whether something is
jade and whether something scratches a steel nail). Thus the cholesterol problem prima facie seems
like grist for Kim’s mill.
We submit that it’s too early to claim victory for e-parent sufficiency because there is yet
another constraint on variable sets that solves the cholesterol problem without implying full-blown
macro-level epiphenomenalism. Recall that the motivation for regarding the cholesterol case as
supporting e-parent sufficiency is that e-parent sufficiency forces us to attend to LDC × HDC.
This is prima facie desirable because the effect of TC on D varies with different realizations
of TC. In probabilistic terms, this means that TC does not screen off its realizers from D.37
An individual’s total cholesterol may tell us something about their risk of heart disease, but we
would gain significantly more information about that risk if we additionally knew the specific way
in which their total cholesterol is realized in terms of low density cholesterol and high density
cholesterol. If it were the case that TC screened off LDC × HDC from D, then the effect of
interventions on TC would be perfectly well specified, since we could just choose an arbitrary
realizing value of LDC × HDC for the value to which TC was set, and this arbitrary choice
would make no difference to the probability distribution over D. So the intuition that we must
attend to LDC × HDC over and above TC is reliant on the fact that TC does not screen off
its supervenience base LDC × HDC from D. Similarly, the reason that ‘jade’ strikes us as a
non-projectible chemical predicate is that it does not screen off its realizers from its chemical behav-
35Here, LDC×HDC denotes the Cartesian product of HDC and LDC. By definition, TC supervenes on this variable,
and by stipulation this variable is correlated with D. Given MMC and the fact that TC doesn’t screen off LDC ×HDC
from D, we can infer that LDC ×HDC is (relative to this variable set) a direct cause of D.
36This variable set is typically treated as causally sufficient in the literature, but there could be reason to believe that it’s
not since, e.g., whether someone has a fatty diet is causally relevant to their total cholesterol and whether they get heart
disease. Moreover, it may be that the cholesterol problem isn’t so problematic when we attend to these common causes of
TC and D since their presence in V implies constraints on what counts as a bona fide intervention on TC relative to V,
and thereby rules out some problematic “interventions”. (For example, we cannot intervene to increase someone’s total
cholesterol by giving them bacon cheeseburgers because this is not independent from whether they have a fatty diet.) We
are interested in pursuing this line of reasoning further, but abstain from doing so here for reasons of brevity. It’s worth
noting, though, that if we can make good on this line of reasoning — i.e., on using considerations of causal sufficiency to
solve the cholesterol problem — then this only helps the antireductionist’s case (since siding with causal sufficiency over
e-parent sufficiency wins the debate for the antireductionist). Thus there is no reason to worry that we are pulling the
wool over the reader’s eyes by not pursuing this line of reasoning here.
37See Chalupka et al. (2017) and Woodward (2010) for a related diagnosis cholesterol-like problems.
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ior — e.g., from whether the the steel nail gets scratched. This all motivates the following definition
Difference Maker (DM) Sufficiency: V is DM sufficient if and only if there do not exist
any variables L,X, Y such that (i) L /∈ V, (ii) X,Y ∈ V, (iii) L is a common e-parent of X and
Y in an admissible graph over the extended variable set V ∪ {L}, and (iv) it is not the case that
either X screens off L from every variable in V \ {X,L} or that Y screens off L from every variable
in V \ {Y,L}.
It is easily observed that DM sufficiency is a strictly weaker requirement than e-parent sufficiency.
While e-parent sufficiency requires the inclusion of all common e-parents (since it just says that
the first three sub-conditions must be satisfied), DM sufficiency requires only the inclusion of those
common e-parents that satisfy the fourth sub-condition — roughly, those e-parents that are not
screened off from everything in the variable set by one of their e-children.
To illustrate, let’s apply DM sufficiency to the cholesterol problem. Consider again the set
V = {TC,D} under the assumption that TC does not screen off D from LDC × HDC. Since
LDC ×HDC is a common e-parent of TC and D (as observed above) and TC does not screen it
off from D (or vice versa, by symmetry of independence), it follows that LDC ×HDC, TC, and
D jointly fulfill the four conditions on L,X and Y in the definition of DM sufficiency. Thus, as
desired, V is not DM sufficient in this case. Like e-parent sufficiency, DM sufficiency forces us to
attend to TC’s supervenience base, LDC ×HDC.
This means that DM sufficiency provides a natural weakening of e-parent sufficiency that is
still capable of solving the cholesterol problem. Crucially, DM sufficiency does not require that
we always include all common e-parents of the variables being considered, and thereby manages
to vindicate some macro-level causal claims. It rather requires that we include just those common
e-parents that make a difference in the sense that the effects of interventions on variables that
supervene on those e-parents are underspecified.38 ,39
Now, there are two obvious criticisms that one could level at the DM sufficiency condition,
which we reply to in turn. First, fans of causal sufficiency may worry that DM sufficiency is not
significantly weaker than e-parent sufficiency, and that, like e-parent sufficiency, it still invalidates
most of the causal claims of the special sciences. It is rarely the case that a variable completely
screens off its supervenience bases from the variables to which it is (or seems to be) causally related
in the real world. For example, it is economic orthodoxy that productivity causally influences
38Note that there is a strong affinity between the motivating intuitions behind our definition of DM sufficiency and the
treatment of causal proportionality given by List and Menzies (2009). List and Menzies argue that higher level causes
trump lower level causes whenever the effect is insensitive to variations in the lower level realizers of the prospective higher
level cause. This condition is not fulfilled by the total cholesterol variable in the cholesterol problem, so advocates of List
and Menzies’ view would presumably acknowledge the need for a definition of sufficiency that does not entail the causal
efficacy of total cholesterol. And like List and Menzies, our definition of DM sufficiency focuses on whether the effect is
sensitive to the higher level cause’s lower level realisers when the cause is held fixed.
39Observe that DM sufficiency renders the question of whether a variable’s supervenience base must be included as de-
pendent on what other variables are included in the variable set. For example, while we need to include the jadeite/nephrite
variable when considering the effect of jade on whether the nail is scratched (because this makes a difference to whether
the nail is scratched), we don’t need to include it when we’re exclusively concerned with the effect of jade on the price of
jewelery in an economy whose participants are unaware of the difference between jadeite and nephrite.
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economic growth. But productivity supervenes on both the number of hours worked and the value
of the output of that work. And it seems implausible to claim that productivity completely screens
off economic growth from these two factors. So when assessing the causal influence of productivity
on growth, DM sufficiency will always require us to include an extra variable that corresponds to
hours worked and the value of the output, and relative to this larger variable set, productivity will
typically be represented as causally inert. Thus, like e-parent sufficiency, DM sufficiency prima
facie seems to invalidate most macro-level causal claims. If this is right, then DM sufficiency is of
limited use to enemies of epiphenomenalism.
We are sympathetic to this challenge, but it’s important to note that it does not bear on the
central argument of our paper. These considerations may push us towards causal sufficiency over
DM sufficiency, but, again, the antireductionist interventionist’s case is resolutely made if causal
sufficiency is the appropriate constraint in multi-level contexts.40 What matters for our argument
is that it undercuts the alleged advantage that e-parent sufficiency has over its competitors by
representing an option that aptly diagnoses problematic macro-level causal claims (e.g., involving
jade and total cholesterol) as false without implying full-blown epiphenomenalism. Here, we submit
that DM sufficiency improves upon e-parent sufficiency by providing us with a tool that distinguishes
those cases where macro-level properties are not autonomous from those cases where they are.
Another prospective criticism of DM sufficiency is that it can lead one to omit common causes in
the single variable setting and, in so doing, yield spurious causal inferences. To illustrate, consider
three pairwise correlated variables, C,E1, E2 and suppose that (i) C is a common cause of E1 and
E2, and (ii) C is not a difference maker for E1/E2, i.e. C is screened off from E2 by E1. Then the
DM sufficiency condition will allow us to make causal inferences over the variable set V− = {E1, E2}
— i.e. it will allow us to omit the variable C from our consideration of the relationship between E1
and E2. And since E1 and E2 are correlated, we will be forced to infer a causal relationship between
them. But it’s perfectly possible that the correlation between E1 and E2 is due entirely to their
sharing a common cause C, in which case the inferred relationship is spurious. So DM sufficiency
is too weak insofar as it allows for the consideration of too many variable sets, and thereby licenses
some of the spurious inferences that were prohibited by causal sufficiency.
In order to respond to this criticism, it will be instructive to briefly consider exactly what it
means for C to count as a (direct) common cause of E1 and E2. A popular and intuitive formalization
of this claim is that C counts as a direct cause of both E1 and E2 relative to the variable set V =
{C,E1, E2}, obtained by adding C to V− = {E1, E2}. But we’ve still not specified precisely what
it means for one variable to count as direct cause relative to V. There are two plausible options.
On the first option, X is a direct cause of Y relative to V if X is a direct cause of Y relative to
every admissible minimal graph over V. On the second option, X is a direct cause of Y relative
to V if X is a direct cause of Y relative to some admissible minimal graph over V. Call the first
condition the ‘stringent’ condition and the second condition the ‘lax’ condition.
Suppose that we adopt the stringent condition. Then C’s being a common cause of E1 and E2
means that every admissible minimal graph over V = {C,E1, E2} represents C as a direct cause
of E1 and E2. But we’ve stipulated that C is not a difference maker for E1/E2, meaning that E1
40At this juncture, it’s worth stressing that some violations of DM sufficiency may be worse than others. It’s plausible
that a given violation is problematic to the extent that the omitted supervenience base makes a difference. This scalar
property can perhaps be analyzed in terms of degrees of correlation, but we leave this for a later date.
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Figure 7: Minimal DAGs over {C,E1, E2} when C is not a difference maker for E1/E2.
screens off C from E2. This in turn entails that the right most DAG in Figure 7 is minimal, and
hence that there exists an admissible minimal graph over V = {C,E1, E2} in which C is not a
direct cause of E2. Since we’re adopting the stringent condition, this implies that C is not really a
common cause of E1 and E2. So when we adopt the stringent condition, we automatically rule out
the possibility of there existing variable sets which satisfy the DM sufficieny condition while leaving
out common causes, and the criticism simply dissolves.
Now let’s consider the lax condition. Given this understanding of ‘direct cause’, C’s being a
common cause of E1 and E2 means that there exists some admissible minimal graph over V in
which C is represented as a common direct cause of E1 and E2. Thus the lax condition says that it
is indeed the case that C counts as a common cause of E1 and E2, since the left DAG in Figure 7
represent C as a direct cause of both E1 and E2. But note also that the right most DAG in Figure
7 represents E1 as a direct cause of E2. The lax condition also implies that E1 counts as a direct
cause of E2 relative to V. This then suggests that the the inference that E1 is causally related to
E2 is not spurious at all. So either one adopts the stringent condition, in which case DM sufficiency
never leads one to leave out common causes in the first place, or one adopts the lax condition, in
which case the causal verdicts that one obtains by leaving out common causes are all non-spurious.
Either way, the problem is defused.
How does this all bear on the status of the exclusion argument? As before, we adopt the WCP
in favor of SCP. This means that in order to establish the possible causal efficacy of M1, we only
need to find one DM sufficient variable set V such that M1 is represented as causally efficacious in
some minimal graph over V. As before, a salient option here is V = {M1,M2}, i.e. the variable set
that omits the physical realizers of the relevant mental states. Whether this set is DM sufficient
depends on whether M1 screens off P1 from M2. And whether that is the case, or approximately the
case, is a substantive empirical question that probably cannot be settled from the armchair. Either
way, there doesn’t seem to any a priori reason to rule out the possibility that mental variables like
M1 sometimes screen off their realizers from other mental variables like M2, which means that we
cannot rule out the possibility that V is DM sufficient. And since M1 is represented as a cause of
M2 in a minimal graph over V, advocates of DM sufficiency can’t rule out the possibility of mental
causation a priori. Thus like causal sufficiency, DM sufficiency allows for the construction of an
antireductionist theory of multi-level causal inference.
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7 Conclusion
It’s time to take stock. In the first few sections of the paper, we considered a natural generalization
of the CBN framework to the multi-level setting, and concluded that the soundness of Gebharter’s
CBN-theoretic formulation of the causal exclusion argument hinges on the question of which variable
sets can legitimately be considered in the context of multi-level causal inference. Then, we argued
that on some plausible ways of constraining variable sets in multi-level settings, the causal exclusion
argument does not go through successfully. More specifically, opting for causal sufficiency as a
constraint results in the full-blown vindication of antireductionism, while opting for DM sufficiency
vindicates a more moderate brand of antireductionism.
To see the picture more clearly, it may be helpful to consider its application to Putnam’s (1975)
peg. In order to vindicate the autonomous explanatory power of macro-level properties, Putnam
famously considers the example of a wooden board containing two holes. The first hole is circular
with a diameter of 1 inch and the second hole is square with a length of 1 inch per side. A
cubical peg that is 15/16 of an inch on each side will fit through the second hole, but not the first.
According to Putnam, this is explained entirely by the macro-level properties of the peg and the
holes, as described above. From an explanatory perspective, the micro-level properties of the peg
are redundant. Once you know the macro-level properties, the micro has no further role to play.
It is exactly this screening off property (referenced in DM sufficiency) that accounts for the fact
that nothing is gained from attending to the micro-details in this case. That is, because the nature
of the peg’s realization base makes no difference for the effect of its size on whether it will fit, DM
sufficiency says that it’s fine to ignore the peg’s realization base. But in other examples (e.g., the
cholesterol case or Kim’s (1992) jade example), the macro-level property’s effects vary with how it
is realized, and DM sufficiency correspondingly requires that we include the realization base. If we
side with DM sufficiency over causal sufficiency, then we get a nice picture of why Putnam’s peg is
a legitimate causal kind and why Kim’s jade is not — i.e., DM sufficiency requires that you attend
to whether the jade is jadeite or nephrite (and in the process repudiates the legitimacy of ‘jade’ as
a cause), while it does not require that you attend to the realizer of Putnam’s peg (and thus does
not repudiate the legitimacy of Putnam’s peg as a causal kind).
Of course, as we mentioned earlier, if we side with DM sufficiency, then we condemn a great
many causal claims that are part and parcel of the special sciences (since the micro-details often do
make some difference). Insofar as there is reason to square with this practice, there may be reason
to side with causal sufficiency. But DM sufficiency does have the decided advantage over causal
suffiency of being able to classify some genuinely problematic higher-level causal generalizations as
false. Either way — i.e., no matter whether you prefer causal sufficiency or DM sufficiency — there
is an open path to antireductionist interventionism. The question is just how antireductionist this
interventionism should be.
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